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Abstract
This article closely examines (a) the representational connotation which is often
implicit in many analyses of the scientific knowledge which children have (or have
not) acquired when they are asked to say or show what they know and (b) the still
common-place presumption that recollections are akin to the extraction of ideas
from a mental database. We demonstrate how recent findings in neuroscience reject
traditional thinking about the nature of ‘representation’ and the character of associ-
ated imagery and verbal explanation. Researchers have to contend with the fact that
concepts must be regarded as flexible, and that memory is dynamic. Such consider-
ations emphasise the creative, rather than the reproductive, nature of remembering,
thus calling into question the status of what is thought to be ‘grasped’ and ‘imaged’
by those being interviewed, possibly casting some doubt on the status of children’s
conceptions (and misconceptions) and the categories into which these are sometimes
placed in schematic depictions of their understanding. Examples from research on
children’s cosmologies are used to illustrate the discussion. It is argued that science
education researchers endeavouring to uncover what children know, intuitively and
scientifically, through interviewing them, face a reconsideration of the theoretical
underpinnings to much of their work.
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Introduction
“… every act of perception is to some degree an act of creation and every act of memory
is to some degree an act of the imagination.” Edelman and Changeux (2001, p. 56)
We spend much of our lives endeavouring to explain what we mean, clarifying our
understanding of things we have encountered, trying to account for the sense they make
and the significance they have for us personally. As we explain to others—to teachers and
fellow students during instruction, to friends in conversation or to researchers while they
interview us—we also explain to ourselves through what Vygotsky described as ‘inner
speech’ (see Vygotsky 1986). And, as we do so, the mental processes invoke images as
well as the words we are trying to use to make things clear to the listener, whether self or
other. What we see in our ‘mind’s eye’ usually, but not always, complements our verbal
expressions and gives coherence (at least a coherence that works for us) to what we are
trying to describe or the ideas we seek to explain. The relationship(s) between the images
we ‘see’ and the explanations we offer as we think and respond to questioning are the
focus of this article. Given recent revelations in neuroscience, they require to be under-
stood in terms of what researchers in that field refer to as the flexibility of concepts, the
dynamics of memory and its possible non-representational nature. In Bryce and Blown
(2016), we gave a first account of how ideas are dynamic and multi-modal, actively
created at the point of recall, using children’s cosmologies as the focus of our research.
The present paper extends that argument, exploiting consciousness as ‘a kind of remem-
bered present’, in the sense used by Edelman to indicate the dynamic interaction between
memory and ongoing perception1. We consider here what is meant by ‘non-representa-
tional memory’ (on which the literature is sparse and awaits further developments in brain
research permitting closer analysis of both conscious and unconscious processes) and
findings in cognition research which are in support of the creation as well as the inhibition
of concepts. The emphasis of our own empirical study, described in this paper, focuses on
multi-modal cognitive evidence for the dynamic memory and imagery associated with the
coexistence of everyday and scientific concepts.
For the most part, researchers in the field of science education—a quite different
domain to neuroscience—especially those concerned with what interviews reveal about
children’s knowledge and its acquisition have, on the whole, followed the more conven-
tional line of argument that science concepts, once acquired by a young person at any
particular stage of schooling, are mental entities which, possessing some functional
stability at that time, will be drawn from memory in order to answer questions and solve
the problem. The evidence we adduced in Blown and Bryce (2010), and which we will
refer to later, supported such functional stability. The researcher’s task has been to
understand the nature of such concepts—to reveal how the interviewee’s ideas are repre-
sented as mental entities—and a ‘flexibility’ of these representations has rarely been a
consideration. Indeed, very many reports say nothing about the exact ‘constitutional’
status of the ideas they detect in pupils’ thinking (however scientifically correct or not
they are), and they simply record: ‘This is what 10 year olds typically say….’ (cf. Blown
1 “Looked at from the inside, consciousness seems continuously to change, yet at each moment it is all of a piece
– what I have called ‘the remembered present’ – reflecting the fact that all my past experience is engaged in
forming my integrated awareness of this single moment” (Edelman 2005, p. 8).
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and Bryce 2010). In many investigations, particularly those concerned with basic science
concepts, including children’s comprehension of ideas in astronomy, it is assumed that
when children are remembering, the process is typically thought of as a ‘reproductive’ act:
interviewees are extracting information from their memories and ideas come out, largely
‘intact’ (This is how I see it/My teacher taught me that…/Mum always used to say that
when…). Not infrequently, applied research has been focused on how concepts may be
refined or corrected with exposure to appropriate pedagogical initiatives. That said,
researchers readily concede that the exact words a child will use to explain their thinking
as they say what they remember, and the drawings and models they may produce to
amplify their points, will vary from time to time and situation to situation; what is being
recalled is not rigidly definable though a semi-structured interview can get at what the
pupil knows, especially at the hands of an interviewer who uses Socratic dialogue with
sensitivity. In comparing traditional with contemporary, research-informed views of what
is actually remembered, this paper looks at what recent findings, particularly those from
brain research, mean for investigators concerned to uncover children’s knowledge. While
the results of neuroscientific investigations and the findings from cognition research do
not directly equate—stemming from different levels of analysis—they ought to be com-
patible with each other, or at least congruent in some ways. Our interview study—reported
later—looked for indications of the flexibility to be associated with conceptualisations: we
sought to shed light on the intrigues concerning representation and non-representation in
how and what people remember. First, we trace the evolution which has taken place in the
relevant fields, drawing from published literature in cognition, neuroscience and science
education.
Images, Mental Representation and the Dynamics of Memory
Historically, the links between images and verbal accounts have received somewhat
sporadic attention in cognitive psychology and educational research, especially in
developmental studies concerned with learning and the accumulation of knowledge. In
the aftermath of behaviourism, Paivio (1971, 1986) is widely acknowledged as having
rejuvenated research into the distinction between verbal and visual representation in our
cognitions. His theory of dual-coding recognised the importance of imagery during mental
processing; how there can be memory benefits as a result, thus contributing to what is
deemed to be what we ‘know’. Thomas (2014) has recently commented that dual-coding
had “inspired an enormous amount of controversy and experimental research in psychol-
ogy” and that it was “one of the most influential theories of cognition in the [20th] century”
(p. 1). Much of the empirical work conducted over these years was indeed of an exper-
imental, or quasi-experimental, nature; relatively little of it was devoted to interviews
designed to uncover subjects’ knowledge. However, whether it focused on images or
verbalised thoughts, cognitive researchers in the later decades of the century challenged
the implicit notion of treating the brain’s operations as if it was a computing device,
instead emphasising its active nature and therefore how ‘neural contents’—
conceptualisations—could not be inherently representational in nature. This led to what
was termed the dynamical hypothesis (see Schacter 1996; Davids and Bennett 1998; van
Gelder 1998; Freeman and Skarda 1990a, b). According to van Gelder (1998), “… a small
but influential contingent of dynamicists have found the notion of representation to be
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dispensable or even a hindrance for their particular purposes” (p. 622). Schacter (1996)
pointedly stated:
Could a computer engage in mental time travel, revisiting and re-experiencing the past,
the way we do?… If a computing robot cannot achieve rudimentary consciousness, then
it is hard to see how it could ever engage in subjective experiences of remembering, or
have the feeling that memories ‘belong’ to it? (p. 34).
Thus he firmly asserted that any ‘cognitive software’ must operate through the biological
substrate of neural networks and the body within which they are grounded.
Importantly, over the last decade or so, research in neuroscience has supported such
considerations, particularly those studies concerned with mental representation, for they have
brought a significant and quite different bearing to what in dual-coding theory had been
described as the correlations2 between images and explanations. In consequence, the theoret-
ical underpinning to investigations involving recall—including those where semi-structured
interviews are used to explore children’s grasp of scientific concepts—requires a closer re-
examination. An attempt is made here to accommodate what is now known about the workings
of neural networks and how these affect (and effect) expressions of understanding in different
modalities.
Assumptions About Remembering
As stated before, a common presumption regarding the mental representation of ideas we have
acquired has been that they are entities encoded (somehow) in the cortex of the brain, entities
which we access, as if drawing from a database, as and when required. In cognition research,
reference has been made to them variously as concepts (see Carey 2009; Stanford 2015),
mental models (see Gentner and Stevens 1983; Johnson-Laird 1983; Vosniadou and Brewer
1992, 1994) or frameworks (see Driver and Easley 1978; Driver 1981; Vosniadou et al. 2008;
Vosniadou and Skopeliti 2014). They are traditionally considered to be directly elicited from
episodic and semantic memory for the purpose in hand (see Tulving 1972, 2002; Wheeler et al.
1997). In this context, the term ‘concepts’ would include ‘misconceptions’ (see Gardner 1991;
Smith et al. 1993), ‘alternative frameworks’ (Driver et al. 1985), ‘prior knowledge’ (Ausubel
2000), ‘notions’ (in particular about the Earth’s shape and gravity as used in the late 1970s in
the research by Nussbaum and Novak 1976 and Nussbaum 1979) and ‘culturally constructed
ways of knowing’ (Aikenhead 1996, 1997).
Though, in developmental terms, conceptualisations change with experience and learning,
the here-and-now representations we are using as we think and interact with others are
traditionally thought of as having an ‘intactness’ or ‘working’ stability. It has also been
considered that they are robustly independent of how we encountered the idea(s) originally,
brought them into play during previous exchanges, or can act upon them in some way. That is,
they have been said to be (or have become) abstract, “inherently non-perceptual, or what I will
call amodal” in nature (Barsalou 1999, p. 577), somehow separate from, but useful to how we
are mentally processing matters now, in the present (see also Barsalou 2003, 2008). Thus, for
example, many young children who have an understanding that the Earth moves may only
2 As in references to the reciprocity and determinants of naming and imaging in measurements of reaction times
in, for example, Paivio et al. (1989).
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know of its orbital revolution around the Sun; they may not know of the Earth’s rotational spin
around its own axis (and vice versa). However, their multi-modal responses typically reveal
consistency and coherence from the interviewee’s perspective; the mode of representation can
change but the concept or mental model is the same. In that sense, their memory of the Earth’s
movement is dynamic; their mental model may be well short of fuller scientific understanding
and detail, but it ‘works’ to allow the individual to show what they make of the researcher’s/
teacher’s questions. Some memories of Earth, Sun and Moon (ESM) motion are also active in
the sense that they involve moving imagery of rotation and revolution. They may also be
dynamic in the sense of switching as children select appropriate images for the context from
their repertoire of everyday and scientific concepts, some being inhibited at certain points in an
interview.
Regarding mental imagery, a common presumption in much of the earlier literature in
cognition was the notion that, as we try to remember, the images we are accessing are
camera-like recordings of previously encountered experiences, that we are seeing again a
visual image that we saw before. Researchers (in all of the inter-related fields) no longer
consider this to be the case. As with recalling ideas, commonly held presumptions about
visualising turn out not to be supported by the data provided in recent neuroscientific
research. Before we focus on this research, it is proper to note that debates about the nature
of images themselves were a preoccupation of cognitive researchers in the later decades of
the last century.
What We See in Our Mind’s Eye
The arguments about the nature of imagery were analysed closely in Pylyshyn’s (2002)
article: Mental imagery: in search of a theory, and in the 34 forum articles published in
its wake (together with the author’s own rejoinder). All of the papers looked at whether
we should or should not adhere to the view that images are depictive phenomena akin to
visual perceptions. In scrutinising relevant experimental data from the field of cognition
(including those few from then available neuroscientific investigations), Pylyshyn him-
self considered that the evidence did not support the ‘picture-theory’ of images (the
common-sense understanding of ‘pictures in the head’ or ‘what we see in our mind’s
eye’) over a ‘symbol-structure’ theory of mental imagery (see p. 157 in particular). He
was doubtful about the nature of what was intrinsic to images. Amongst the reactions to
his paper was the evidence cited by Artberry et al. (2002) which led them to reject both
the literal picture-in-the-head view, and the entirely symbolic view and Bartolomeo and
Chokron (2002) who concluded that space-related imagery seemed to involve both
attentional and intentional aspects. Burgess (2002) considered evidence that was in
favour of space-related representation, while Chatterjee (2002) pointed out that the visual
cortex does not display internal visual images, though “Nestled between pictures and
propositions, primitive spatial schemas with simple analog features extracted from
pictorial scenes may play a subtle but wide role in cognition” (p. 186). Goldenberg
(2002) suggested that imagery is “exclusively based on explicit knowledge, whereas
retrieval of ‘tacit’ visual knowledge is bound to the presence of the object and the task of
recognising it” (p. 191). In what turned out to be significant, given twenty-first century
research findings about the brain’s workings, Thomas (2002) noted at that time that
pictures versus symbols did not exhaust the options for imagery—“embodied, active
perception” (p. 211) offered an alternative.
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Moving forward to recent investigations in neuroscience, and in accord with this point, an
example of how conventional presumptions do not receive support from experimental data is
contained in the article by Hoenig et al. (2008) who state that:
… accumulating evidence suggests that concepts are embodied in perception and action
in that their conceptual features are stored within modality-specific semantic maps in
[the] sensory and motor cortex (p. 3, emphases added).
And, in their careful review of the current evidence3 concerning the structural and neural basis
of conceptual memory, Kiefer and Pulvermüller (2011) conclude that “concepts are flexible,
distributed representations” (p. 805).
‘Distributed representation’ and ‘modality-specific’mean, respectively, that (i) the semantic
features of each acquired concept are variously encoded by multiple layers of neural networks,
not as one entity in the semantic cortex, and (ii) the networks are those concerned with
sensation, expression and movement. Particular, individual networks are influenced by earlier,
relevant encounters we have had, and altered by the ongoing and subsequent interchange of
signals taking place between functionally separated mappings. The mechanisms described by
Edelman (2005, 2006) as re-entry processes enable this to happen (see below).
Describing concepts as ‘flexible’ recognises that, contrary to common presumption, they
are “tailored to the current contextual constraints, because they are constituted of dynamically
recruited features depending on the context [of their recollection]” (Keifer and Pulvermüller
2011, p. 807). This emphasises the creative, as opposed to the reproductive, nature of
remembering. That is, on the point of answering another’s question, we put together, as best
we can, (mental) entities befitting the requirements asked of us. Memory is therefore, in a very
significant sense, a dynamic process, not a static reiteration. What we answer with, and how
we answer, can vary depending on whether we choose, or are prompted, to respond verbally,
draw pictorially, or indicate by gesture, or enact by the use of, or devising, a physical model, or
might possibly result from unconscious associations (Dresp-Langley 2012). To cite Keifer and
Pulvermüller (2011) again,
conceptual flexibility implies that access to a concept during language comprehension or
thinking cannot be conceived as a replay of stored sensory-motor information as in a
movie, but as a context-specific situation-dependent dynamic activation process (p. 809).
(See also our illustrations in respect of children’s cosmologies in Bryce and Blown 20164.)
And, with regard to recent cognition research into imagery, it is pertinent to note the
conclusion of Funk et al. (2005) (from developmental studies of children trying to position
their hands to match pictures of hands photographed in a variety of postures) that their results
3 Researchers draw from experimental psychological studies involving behavioural and neuroimaging trials with
healthy volunteer patients, from transcranial magnetic stimulation investigations, and from case studies of
patients with brain lesions in specific areas.
4 We looked closely at the relationships between what was revealed as children manipulated their own play-
dough models and their apparent understandings of Earth/Sun/Moon concepts, focusing specifically on the
switching taking place between what was said, what was drawn and what was modelled. The evidence was
supportive of Edelman’s view that memory is non-representational and that concepts are the outcome of
perceptual mappings, a view also in accord with Barsalou’s notion that concepts are simulators or skills which
operate consistently across several modalities.
Research in Science Education
“strongly suggest that young children’s kinetic imagery is guided by motor processes, even
more so than adults” (p. 402).
Feedback and Re-entry Processes
Traditional thinking about mental models (predicated on the notion of concept stability,
however temporary on a longer time scale) seems so plausible and convincing. This
alone may explain why it has been difficult to replace it with the view of conceptual
flexibility so strongly now indicated by neuroscientific research. Perhaps, however, it has
something to do with the differences between feedback and re-entry mechanisms and
how the latter relate to Edelman’s description of the degeneracy5 in neural circuits.
Feedback mechanisms, of long-standing status, are the means through which positive re-
affirmation helps to ensure the retention of our thinking. Anatomically, it seems natural
to assume that the means in question involve straightforward linkages between contig-
uous neural circuits, that ‘messages’ are channelled by and within modalities, with
signals returning confirmation to the semantic cortex (but see reference to Mareschal
2016 below). However, Edelman’s investigations demonstrated that the brain’s wiring is
so much more sophisticated, its complexity ensuring multiple, near-simultaneous syn-
chronicity between widely distributed neuronal groups. The huge number of parallel, bi-
directional connections means that mental processing cannot simply be considered as the
execution of algorithms rendered by straightforward feedback loops (see Edelman 2005,
p. 111 in particular). Thus, when someone considers his/her answer to an interviewer’s
question, the individual formulates a response heavily dependent on the circumstances
and may switch between a range of verbal expressions learned on earlier occasions or
images constructed (or ‘seen’) previously (whether formally or casually). How coherent
these may be will be much influenced by their previous efforts to make sense of the
inter-connected meanings they have or have not forged. In relation to remembering
images and explanations, recollection was implied earlier to mean ‘conjointly’. We
should acknowledge the interactivity or influences between them as responses are
formulated—influences which are largely unconscious and possibly unknowable to the
outsider. In keeping with the results of Hoenig et al. (2008, p. 18), “… conceptual
features contribute to a concept to varying degrees in a flexible context-dependent
manner”. The individual therefore may switch between features and alter his/her con-
templations mid-response. In Blown and Bryce (2017), we cite examples of children
switching between everyday and scientific language during the course of interviews,
thereby exposing a mixture of conceptual attributes, some of which may be in conflict
(and possibly lead to confusions in the categories into which an observer might classify
children’s thinking). In the next section, we shall say more about ‘switching’.
It is readily apparent in the literature that several writers of different persuasions find
difficulty with the terms which Edelman used, some feeling it necessary to re-emphasise his
findings in the face of doubt and resistance expressed by others. Interestingly, Rose considers
that the term ‘re-entry’, coined by Edelman, has itself been confusing and refers to the multiple
and reciprocal interconnections amongst the module circuitry in the brain (see Rose 2006,
5 Edelman used degeneracy, not to refer to deterioration, but in relation to redundancy because so many areas of
the brain handle the same or similar tasks. The re-entry processes lead selectively to (self-) preferred ways of
reasoning.
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2007). Others have been at pains to stress how different re-entry is from feedback6. Before we
consider the implications of this kind of research and theorising for interview research, it is
pertinent to consider a further matter, namely issues associated with investigations into
conceptual change.
Evidence and Argument from the Literature on Conceptual Change
Science education researchers have, for some considerable time, adopted the constructivist
perspective on learning, irrespective of the term they use for students’ scientifically incorrect
ideas. The literature on constructivism itself has seen debate on the how, when and what
changes can be associated with students acquiring new ideas, particularly in relation to
teaching methods. The mix of terms—misconceptions/alternative frameworks/preconcep-
tions/naïve and intuitive ideas/…—is usefully considered in Leonard et al. (2014). Examples
of pedagogical research publications in the science field are Rahman (2004) and Cakir (2008).
For the purposes of the present article, it is worth noting how fruitful children’s cosmologies
have been as an area for evidence of change and restructuring in children’s thinking, beginning
with the cross-cultural work of Vosniadou, Brewer and others in the 1980s (see Brewer et al.
1987). Influenced by Gentner and Stevens (1983) and Johnson-Laird (1983), they used the
notion of mental models to account for the development of children’s ideas and the ways in
which thinking changes with life experiences and teaching. Interest in the significance of
previous/early learning has grown through recent years, we ourselves having contributed to
deliberations using Chinese and New Zealand children as subjects in interview research (see
Bryce and Blown 2006; Blown and Bryce 2017, 2018).
Of particular relevance to matters here have been debates about ‘coherence’ versus
‘fragmentation’ in the ideas which subjects adduce during recall. In Blown and Bryce
(2010), we reported on findings from multi-modal interview surveys of young people’s
knowledge. What children said or showed displayed coherence across modalities within and
between longitudinal surveys, findings which accord with research by others, e.g. Carey
(1991), Chi and Slotta (1993) and Vosniadou et al. (2008), the last of whom stated (p. 4):
At the heart of our theoretical approach is the idea that initial explanations of the
physical world in naïve physics are not fragmented observations but form a coherent
whole, a framework theory.
Our findings supported the position that, when asked to physically model what they thought,
children evidently had some sort of mental ‘content’ to which they referred (sometimes
explicitly by physical shape and hand positions as they formed their play-dough models). It
6 For example, writing at the time of Edelman’s death in 2014, Horgan, a teacher at Stevens Institute of
Technology and science writer, quoted Edelman as saying in interview with him that “Re-entry is the ongoing
recursive signalling between mapped areas that are made by these first few properties, so that you map maps by
massively parallel reciprocal connections. It's not feedback…” (see in Horgan 2014). [According to Edelman,
neural circuits develop and diversify on a Darwinian basis; neurons themselves are not the seat of memories. As
Kahana (2012) has observed: “... memories are stored in the connections between neurons, and these connections
enable the network to recover previously stored memories (p. 161)”.] Seth, a mentee and later co-researcher of
Edelman at the Neurosciences Institute in California, stated in his obituary of the Nobel laureate published in
Frontiers in Psychology: “Edelman emphasized the rampantly “re-entrant” connectivity of the brain, with
massively parallel bidirectional connections linking most brain regions. Uncovering the implications of re-
entry remains a profound challenge today” (Seth 2014).
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seemed likely—if we reason with either Barsalou’s idea of a concept as a skill (Barsalou 2003)
or Edelman’s idea that “concepts are the outcome of the brain mapping its own perceptual
maps leading to generalities” (Edelman 2005, p. 104)—that they were creating comparisons
from mental information by means of simulations, enacted simulations. Thus, a mental model,
perhaps a modification on something grasped previously, is something which is created by the
individual at the point when he or she is required to recall. Consistency is reflected in
similarities between past and present constructions and coherence is substantially about the
interconnections amongst ideas or concepts constituting the individual’s worldview. In his
‘knowledge-in-pieces’ theory, diSessa has a slightly different focus, arguing that coherence
comes from an integration of sub-conceptual elements (his notion of phenomenological
primitives, or ‘p-prims’) into concepts in response to specific contexts (diSessa 1983, 1988,
1993, 2008, 2017). With this focus, the initial sub-elemental ideas are incoherent and not
integrated into a working schema akin to a scientific theory. It is noteworthy that Vosniadou
and Brewer (1992), in an earlier study, interpreted their interview data as indicating that “there
are some stable underlying conceptual structures which constrain the range of possible mental
models that children can form” (pp. 575–576).
The Coexistence of Everyday and Scientific Ideas
Relevant to the discussion are the now clearer findings concerning the coexistence of everyday
(or ‘naïve’) ideas and scientific concepts. Rather than more scientific concepts gradually
replacing earlier beliefs, it may, more typically, be a matter of several manifestations
continuing to exist and that what is brought to mind, or constructed on the spot, is
dependent on the context of the questioning. As Driver et al. (1994) stated—in favour of the
coexistence of everyday and scientific views—“Rather than successive equilibrations, it is
argued that learning may be better characterized by parallel constructions relating to specific
contexts” (p. 7). Others have made similar points, including Solomon (1983), Duit (1994),
Taber (2000), Siegal et al. (2004), Potvin (2017) and ourselves (Bryce and Blown 2016;
Blown and Bryce 2017, 2018).
Furthermore, Vosniadou (2014) has recently reported that the coexistence of naive and
scientific theories is supported by two recent groups of findings from neuroscience research:
(1) Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) fMRI experiments on children’s gravity concepts where
Aristotelian (impetus) concepts were interfering with Newtonian ones; and (2) Shulman and
Valcarcel (2012) reaction time studies verifying the truth-value of naive and scientific concepts
where naive ideas were found to coexist with scientific theories. The former study on force and
gravity concepts is reported more fully by Dunbar et al. (2007) and by Petitto and Dunbar
(2009). Similar studies of novices and experts are reported by Brault Foisy et al. (2015) and by
Masson et al. (2014). These studies reported delays in responses to questions, suggesting that
coexisting images or memories or concepts were being compared. The delays were associated
with activity in the regions of the brain identified with error detection such as inconsistencies
in responses to questions indicating cognitive conflict as concepts compete in a process which
results in dominant (more plausible) concepts being selected and less dominant (less plausible)
ones being inhibited. Plausibility thus featured as a tug-of-war between everyday and scientific
concepts.
Notwithstanding the tentative evidence of coexistence being revealed by neuroscience, the
‘conceptual change’ paradigm and the associated ‘knowledge restructuring’ theory, whereby
naive concepts are replaced by scientific ideas as a result of development, learning and
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instruction, continues to dominate constructivist thought amongst researchers. For example,
Brault Foisy et al. (2015, p. 27) firmly state that:
For Vosniadou, Ioannides, Dimitrakopoulou, & Papademetriou, 2001, conceptual
change is “a process that requires the significant reorganization of existing knowledge
structures and not just their enrichment”. Implicit to this, there is the idea that students'
prior knowledge no longer exists after a conceptual change occurs (see Shulman and
Valcarcel 2012).
However, fresh evidence from neuroscience suggests that initial concepts are suppressed by the
process of inhibition but continue to function as an alternative repertoire in memory (see
Mareschal 2016). These findings from traditional research methodologies and from brain
research bring into question the very notion of ‘conceptual change’. It seems that rather than
change, naive concepts remain in memory to be recalled or re-created in response to questions
set in a particular context. If the context affords everyday ideas, then naive and synthetic
concepts are re-created. If the context invites scientific reasoning, then scientific concepts are
re-created.
Semantic memory changes as a result of learning and episodic memory as a result of
personal experience of time and place. Memory of facts and events may remain relatively
intact but recollections differ as memories are re-created within specific contexts and may
become blurred by ‘temporal noise’ with the passing of time in keeping with Edelman’s (1989)
‘remembered present’. Rather than a palimpsest in which the new overwrites and replaces the
old, making the old almost inaccessible, both old and new memories, old (everyday/naive) and
new (scientific) concepts, coexist.
In summary, children’s cosmologies has proved to be a fruitful area for research into
children’s conceptual development: processes of conceptual change including ongoing debates
concerning ‘knowledge restructuring’ versus ‘coexistence of everyday and scientific ideas’;
and ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ versus ‘children’s theories of the world’. It is also an area with the
potential to build foundations in multi-media/multi-modal reasoning such as the use of models
with implications for other fields of teaching and learning. As the (US) National Research
Council (2007) stated:
…taking the time to construct such a robust Earth concept may be worth it for several
reasons. First, it provides a foundational framework for constructing explanations of
many important phenomena that connect to children’s daily lives such as the reasons for
day and night and the causes of the seasons. Second, it provides a wonderful opportunity
for engaging in model-based reasoning during the elementary school years and devel-
oping important epistemological understandings of models (p. 105).
Implications for Interview Research
An implication apparent from the literature cited above is that mainstream notions of mental
models as descriptors of children’s knowledge need to be carefully reconsidered. There has
been a tendency to view such models as having a degree of stability for months or even years
at a time—as apparent in the categories to which many researchers, including ourselves, have
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assigned children’s understandings. While children’s astronomy concepts of ESM shape can
be broadly categorised using mental models or astronomy concept schemes such as those
developed by the authors inspired by the “Earth Notions” of Nussbaum and Novak (1976) (see
Bryce and Blown 2013, Figures 1–3), these are simplifications of a rich variety of responses
from children both everyday and scientific (see Blown and Bryce 2017, 2018) which can be
further reduced into cosmological elements reflecting the structure of the interview (see below
in this paper, Fig. 1).
Certainly, the overall patterns detectable in subject samples have helped to show how far
short of a scientific grasp these understandings often are, together with the developmental
changes which are likely to ensue in children exposed to the normal run of science activities in
schools in those cultures where children are taught by scientifically minded teachers (see
Blown and Bryce 2006 and Bryce and Blown 2007 in respect of comparisons between China
and New Zealand). They afford pointers to what can be usefully focused upon by teachers in
the course of instruction—particularly during those periods when significant shifts in thinking
occur, such as when pupils’ ideas about the solar system are changing from geocentric to
heliocentric, or when animistic and anthropomorphic expressions (say, for the movement and
appearances of the Sun and Moon) are all but dispensed with. (Regarding the persistence of the
latter well through the primary school years, see Blown and Bryce 2018).
However, unless the ideas relating to concept flexibility and the dynamic, and possibly non-
representational, nature of memory are taken into account, there is the risk of researchers
misrepresenting the knowledge which interviewees possess—even in the course of in-depth,
semi-structured interviews. The greatest risk of underestimating knowledge will arise from
mono-modal strategies, for example where only verbal statements are interpreted; the least
from multi-modal strategies where crosschecks can be made via statements, drawings, models
and gesture [see Bryce and Blown (2016) on verbal language, drawing, modelling and gesture;
Goldin-Meadow (2017) on gesture; Anning and Ring (2005), Duffy (2006), Goodnow (1977)
Note. 1
2
3 .
4Habitation of Earth and Identity with Earth were indicated by drawings of “Self” and “a friend on the other side of the Earth”.
5
6Many older children knew that the Earth was a planet orbiting the Sun in the Solar System and knew of other planets such as Venus and Mars.
Spherical
Ground synonymous with surface
Sky synonymous with atmosphere or space
People live all over curved surface
Understanding of gravity
Planet in Space
Member of Solar System
Earth
Earth
Space
Sky
Ground
Earth
Ground
Earth
Self
Sky
Space
Sun
Friend
Sun
Earth
Composite Earth Shape Concept
Spherical1   Ground synonymous with surface (land)2 People live all over curved surface4 Planet in Space6
Sky synonymous with atmosphere or space3       Understanding of gravity5 Member of Solar System
Physical Shape Ground & Sky Habitation & Identity Astronomical Context
Earth Shape Elements
Fig. 1 Earth shape concept (scientific)
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and Malchiodi (1998) on children’s drawings in general; and Vosniadou and Skopeliti (2014)
on the use of children’s drawings to clarify children’s cosmologies]. Multi-modal methodol-
ogies require time-consuming qualitative research, increasingly difficult to tackle because of
the ethical challenges now associated with one-to-one investigations with young children.
Nevertheless, even with them, there are complications of interpretation with multi-modal
research, for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
The overall patterns revealed by generalising across subjects deal with the end products
of their thinking, as we have argued before (Bryce and Blown 2016). They hide the fact
that, at an individual level, each child’s cosmology is unique and they say little about the
process of concept creation. Because researchers describe what they find as end products
in a representational format (influenced no doubt by the fact that that is the form of
reproduction utilised in books and journals which inform and disseminate their work), they
tend to take for granted a representational view of memory, a view that is not supported by
the neuroscientific findings, as we have indicated here. A non-representational interpreta-
tion means that an individual, when questioned, will in fact rapidly switch between (2-d or
3-d) images and explanations for elements potentially relevant to cues in what has been
asked, formulating a response at a speed dictated by familiarity with the setting concerned
and in a mode or format thought best—almost always to answer sincerely—and satisfy the
questioner, perhaps to maximise status at that moment (“This is my best shot”, so to
speak). The elements sourced in the process will vary in accord with what relevant
encounters the individual has had in the area in question. For some interviewees, pertinent
images will prevail, for others they may not be available to be sourced; for some subjects,
relevant words may prevail, but for others no suitable expressions may be accessible; and
so forth. Crucially and for every individual, re-entry processes will mean rapid
crisscrossing between and amongst elements and modalities to generate a response,
whether a spoken answer, a drawing or a devised model. The mental processes taking
place in the sensory and motor cortex enact/construct/re-construct thoughts, exploiting
salient elements as best can. The end product is representational in nature, though others
not articulated, could have been too. Neurologically, pathways involved in re-entry,
whereby the same idea can be expressed through alternative modes of its demonstration,
may be subject to differing degrees of degeneracy. What interviewers hear and see in the
responses of their subjects is a (localised) culmination of elements shaped or dictated
during the very process of their articulation. As Edelman (2006) stated: “In a selectional
brain, memory, imaging, and thought itself all depend on the brain ‘speaking to itself’ by
re-entry” (p. 57); “… memory [is] a dynamic recategorical system property” (p. 59).
Summarising These Points
To sum up at this juncture, the research literature reveals that our understandings of the
expressions ‘mental models’, ‘representational’ and the ‘dynamic’ nature of ideas and
images have all changed significantly over recent decades. Whether from a cognitive or a
socio-cultural perspective, mental models in the field of children’s cosmologies were
largely regarded as being representational in character, even where they were said to be
dynamic (with that term often not explained or defined). As representations, mental
models were accorded meaning as a consequence—“a common error”, according to
Edelman (2005, p. 104). In effect, images and explanations were being thought of as
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remembered depictions, brought from memory and put into play fully formed as mean-
ingful concepts (meaningful in the sense grasped by the interviewee). Now, we can
interpret them as enactments, constructed—at the point of recall—from elements (cf.
diSessa’s ‘p-prims’). Recent findings, especially the insights from brain research, have
enabled us to recognise the complexity of the recollection processes; how these in
themselves are possibly non-representational; but where their products are of such a
nature, with all that that implies for interpreting what the interviewee seems to know (i.e.
non-representational processes may produce representational products).
The dynamism lies in their construction during the creative act of recall, not in a variety
of replications being in contest with each other for application, nor as a single mental
depiction possessing some special property rendering it capable of varied expression. The
psychological and neurological perspectives, exemplified by Barsalou and Edelman,
respectively, suggest avenues for research, though neither seems easily operationalised
or straightforwardly put into testable hypotheses, by virtue of the creative component of
remembering. We can reason in accord with Barsalou (interpreting concepts as situated
simulations or skills in creating images consistently over a range of stimuli and responses)
or in accord with Edelman (recognising that concepts are generated by re-entry processes
involving a variety of neural pathways, the substrate of which does not carry representa-
tions). Either way, dynamicism achieves the ‘fuzziness’ rather than the ‘digitality’ which
Davids and Bennett (1998) stressed is the nature of human remembering. Memory is in a
continual state of flux, being constantly updated. It is regenerated each time an internal or
external cue triggers a conscious reflection on present or past events. Such cues can be
personal musings or questions asked during an interview; and the associated reflections
often involve imagery. Thus imagery and memory are features of consciousness itself. As
Edelman observes:
We experience primary consciousness as a ‘picture’ or a ‘mental image’ of ongoing
categorized events. But… there is no actual image or sketch in the brain. The ‘image’ is
a correlation between different kinds of categorizations… Primary consciousness is a
kind of ‘remembered present’ (Edelman 2001, p. 119).
We note that Pylyshyn’s symbol theory is framed by the paradigm that memory is represen-
tational. However, memory may be non-representational as advocated by Edelman, with
information resulting from the interconnections in networks. Non-representational memory
is not necessarily unconscious. When a concept is re-created in response to a question, the
response is both conscious (in the sense that we are deliberately responding to questions about
a concept) and unconscious (in the sense that we don’t know the processes of re-creation of the
concept). From the research perspective, the investigator’s task is to consider alternative
interpretations regarding interviewees’ statements about what they see in their ‘mind’s eye’.
Research Question
Acknowledging the differences in how interviewees respond during in-depth, multi-modal
investigations; the not insignificant extent of mode switching (see Bryce and Blown 2016
and Blown and Bryce 2017); and the challenge posed by the considerations concerning
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mental construction and representation set out earlier, we scrutinised a wide range of
interview protocols for evidence as to:
& (a) Whether and when children were referring to images linked to their answers and
explanations (spontaneously or cued)
& (b) Whether or not images related to previous recollections in those cases where children
were re-interviewed after a passage of time
& (c) The extent of relevant explanations provided by children where they reported no
associated imagery.
Formalising these as a research question:
RQ What insights into imagery are possible from children’s concepts of the Earth, Sun and
Moon?
Methodology and Participants
An Empirical Study
As in our earlier research, the methodology used here utilised verbal language, drawing
and play-dough modelling to obtain multi-modal responses to questions from an exten-
sive interview guide (see Blown and Bryce 2013, Appendix G) by means of Piagetian
style interviews and Socratic dialogue (Piaget 1929, 1930). Full details have been
described in our previous publications concerning children’s knowledge restructuring
in this area (Blown and Bryce 2006), the coherence detectable in their
conceptualisations (Blown and Bryce 2010), comparisons between novices and experts
(Bryce and Blown 2012) and children’s grasp of the shape and size of the ESM (Bryce
and Blown 2013). Children were asked about the motion of the Earth, the apparent
motion of the Sun while watching the changes in the shadow of a shadow stick and the
motion of the Moon through observation. The motion studies included associated
concepts of time; Daytime and Night-time. The children then drew and modelled the
shape and motion of the ESM and explored the concepts of ‘Habitation of Earth’ and
‘Identity with Earth’ by drawing and modelling themselves and ‘a Friend who lived on
the other side of the world’. This was followed by them modelling the motion of the
ESM; and Daytime and Night-time using their own play-dough models. Next, children
studied concepts of gravity through a series of thought-experiments involving throwing
and dropping balls, and studying the action of water/juice in drink bottles on this side
and the other side of the Earth; and dropping a ball into a hole through the Earth.
Finally, children studied seasons and eclipses (see Blown and Bryce 2010, 2013). At the
end of their interview, children were asked the following questions about imagery: (1)
When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon did you think of any stories you have
been told about them? (2) Did you see any words (in your imagination)? (3) Did you see
any pictures (in your imagination)? (4) Did you see anything moving (in your imagi-
nation)? (5) Where did your ideas come from? (6) What were you thinking of? The
whole interview based on the interview guide lasted up to an hour or so depending on
the attention span of the child, but was broken into shorter sections for drawing and
modelling. Our previous research has consistently shown that young children’s cognitive
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abilities have been underestimated and they are quite capable of introspection and
metacognition (see Donaldson 1978, Gascoine, Higgins and Wall 2016). Initial questions
put to children may be considered novel (having in all probability never been asked such
questions before); hence, the follow-up questions allowed the situation to be clarified.
Participants
One hundred and forty-one children (age 3–12) took part in the study: 73 from
Wairarapa, Wellington Province, New Zealand (36 boys and 37 girls), and 68 from
Changchun, Jilin Province, North East China (34 boys and 34 girls), with the subjects
being matched on socio-economic background based on parents’ occupations. There
Fig. 2 Xu drew a separate drawing for each Season and believed that the Sun was closer to the Earth in summer.
Xu could not imagine ESM moving but could visualise leaves falling from trees in Autumn.
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were 47 kindergarten and pre-school children age 3–5 (NZ 24, China 23), 55 junior
primary school children age 6–8 (NZ 28, China 27) and 39 senior primary school
children age 9–12 (NZ 21, China 18).
Fig. 3 In the story Maui and Sun, the Sun is described as moving around the Earth too quikly: Maui captures it
with ropes and slows it down. Tekaranga thought that the Earth rotated and revolved around the Sun. His
memory thus has both everyday and scientific imagery.
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Table 1 Details of responses to mental imagery questions
Static Imagery 
Specific: Pictures of Earth, Sun and Moon.
General: Images of Self and new Friend who lives a long way away; and images of a Well-hole
________________________________________________________________________________
Group General Specific
__________________________ __________
Self & Friend Well-hole Pictures ESM
___________________________ ___________
f/n % f/n % f/n* %
________________________________________________________________________________
NZ Kindy & Pre-School 18/22 82 7/22 32 4/9 44
China Kindy & Pre-School 13/16 81 8/16 50 3/10 30
NZ Junior Primary School 20/21 95 18/21 86 7/12 58
China Junior Primary School 22/22 100 20/22 91 13/22 59
NZ Senior Primary School 23/23 100 23/23 100 11/17 65
China Senior Primary School 22/22 100 21/22 95 14/22 64
________________________________________________________________________________
*Only those children who had concepts of the Earth, Sun and Moon were asked specific questions.
________________________________________________________________________________
Dynamic Imagery 
Specific: Images of the Motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon
General: Images of the motion of dropped and thrown balls; drink falling from or staying put in a 
bottle on the other side of the Earth; a ball falling through a hole through the Earth
________________________________________________________________________________
Group General Specific
______________________________________________________
Balls Bottles Hole-Through Motion ESM
______________________________________ ___________
f/n % f/n % f/n % f/n* %
_________________________________________________________________ ___________
NZ Kindy & Pre-School 21/22 95 7/22 32 8/22 36 4/9 44
China Kindy & Pre-School 15/16 94 5/16 31 5/16 31 3/10 30
NZ Junior Primary School 21/21 100 12/21 57 15/21 71 6/12 50
China Junior Primary School 22/22     100 13/22 59 14/22 64 13/22 59
NZ Senior Primary School 23/23 100 21/23 91 21/23 91 12/17 71
China Senior Primary School 22/22 100 20/22 91 17/22 95 17/22 77
________________________________________________________________________________
*Only those children who had a spherical Earth concept and a knowledge of “other countries” 
and/or the concept of “the other side of the Earth” were asked about Bottles and Hole-through. Only
those children who held concepts of the Earth, Sun and Moon were asked specific questions.
________________________________________________________________________________
Note. There were no significant differences between the cultures apart from greater knowledge of 
well-holes on the part of children in China (where wells are more common than in NZ). Both Static 
and Dynamic imagery can be seen to increase with age as a result of development and experience 
with the world including learning from teachers, parents, books, TV and other knowledge sources.
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Data Collection, Analysis and Coding
The interviews were recorded on audio and videotape and transcribed by the researcher (with
the assistance of interpreters in China). These protocols together with children’s drawings and
models provided the main qualitative evidence informing the RQ. The interview protocols (see
left-hand columns of Figs. 2 and 3) together with children’s drawings and models were initially
analysed and coded by the researcher using the Cosmological Concept Categorisation Scheme
developed by the authors (see Bryce and Blown 2006). This was used to identify examples of
non-spontaneous static imagery.
These included specific static images—such as pictures of ESMand general static images—such
as images of Self and a Friendwho lives a longway away (on the other side of the Earth) and images
of a well hole or rabbit hole (as in Lewis Carroll’s Alice-in-Wonderland)—as well as dynamic
imagery such as “imagining a ball falling through a hole through the Earth”. A range of exemplars
from each category were checked by two astronomy educators7 from Carter Observatory in
Wellington, NZ, with an inter-coder agreement of 85–95%; Cohen’s kappa κ = 0.83 to 0.94. The
imagery protocols (right-hand columns of Figs. 2 and 3) captured examples of imagery in response
to specific questions, were grouped into categories by the researcher and his interpreters and were
subject to percentage analysis as in Table 1.
Results: Insights into Imagery Afforded by the Studies
The methodology afforded insights into a variety of forms of imagery depending on the
manner of questioning or the nature of the dialogue. The core questions remained constant by
the use of the interview guide; Socratic dialogue served to supplement the standard questions.
Although some results were ‘generalised’ for quantitative analysis, the qualitative richness of
responses is evident from the protocols. Importantly and wherever possible, the interview
questions were triangulated using verbal language, drawing and modelling modalities. Exam-
ples of drawings are included as figures.
Spontaneous (Familiar Context, Concept-Cued) Imagery
In response to the questions about the shape and motion of the ESM:
Did you see any pictures (in your imagination)?
Did you see anything moving (in your imagination)?
Many children were able to visualise the shape and motion of ESM but sometimes the imagery
was of everyday concepts rather than the scientific interpretation. They positively affirmed that
they could see the Earth rotating and revolving when asked.
7 Because the research focuses on children’s astronomy concepts and associated imagery, we selected indepen-
dent assessors who had a background in astronomy and teaching to check our categories. The external coders
were both experienced astronomy educators who were active astronomers and teachers who taught astronomy to
visiting groups of adults and children at Carter Observatory, to student teachers at Victoria University of
Wellington Teachers College and Faculty of Education and to teachers and children at local schools. To maintain
consistency and reliability, we have used the same external coders throughout our studies.
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Protocols
Aroha (NZ Māori: female; age 7 years 0 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon did you think of any stories you
have been told about them?
C. No.
R. Did you see any words or any pictures (in your imagination)?
C. I’ve seen one picture.
R. In your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. What’s the one picture you saw then?
C. I’ve seen a Moon – it’s a full-Moon – and all the dogs howl!
Samantha (NZ European: female; age 8 years 8 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon did you think of any
stories that you have been told about them?
C. No.
R. Did you see any pictures or think of any pictures?
C. Yes.
R. What pictures?
C. Planets – in a book – with pictures in it – I was just looking – I wasn’t thinking about
the book – (the) story, words (or) writing – I was just thinking about the pictures in it.
R. Could you imagine anything moving?
C. Yes – the Sun and the Earth.
Deng Chu Heng (China: Han: male; age 6 years 4 months)
R. When we talk about these things – about the seasons and about the Earth and the
Sun and the Moon, can you imagine them in your mind?
C. Yes.
R. Can you imagine things moving?
C. No.
R. But you know they are moving?
C. I have no pictures of the Earth, Sun and Moon moving but I can imagine the leaves
and the snow falling.
Zhang Zhe (China: Han: male; age 8 years 10 months)
R.When you talk about things moving, can you see themmoving in your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. When you’re talking about eclipses and things like that, can you see pictures in
your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. Do you see any words in your imagination?
C. No.
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Zhou Yi Ping (China: Han: female; age 9 years 3 months)
R. When we talk about the seasons and about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon,
do you get any pictures in your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. Can you imagine things moving?
C. Yes.
Non-spontaneous (Unfamiliar Context, Dialogue-Cued) Imagery
These were cued by dialogue such as:
Imagine that you’re going to draw yourself on the Earth...
Imagine that you’ve got a friend who lives in (China, New Zealand) on the other side of
the Earth...draw your friend...place the model of your friend on the play-dough model of
the Earth.
Most primary children could recall or re-create mental pictures of the shape of the ESM; or
imagine a friend or relative who lives on the other side of the Earth (even where their concept
of it was of the ‘dual-hemisphere’ variety) (see Bryce and Blown 2013, Figure 1; Categories 7
& 8), or imagine a well hole (or wishing well). They did so without difficulty but their ability
to place themselves and their friends on the Earth scientifically depended on their understand-
ing of the shape of the Earth and their concepts of gravity. In this case, imagery was inferred
from children’s drawings and models (such as Friend on the other side of the Earth), but there
were examples of dialogue resulting in imagery of unfamiliar contexts and one capturing a
child in the act of imagining.
Protocols
Ji Jing Xian (China: Han: female; age 10 years 2 months)
R. When you draw the seasons and you think about the Earth and the Sun and the
Moon and you show things moving, can you imagine things moving?
C. Yes.
R. Do you have pictures in your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. Like – could you imagine the hammock swinging?
C. Yes.
[Child had drawn a person swinging in a hammock in summer.]
Lu Xing Yu (China: Han: male; age 9 years 8 months)
R. When we’re doing things like this (modelling eclipses) can you imagine things
moving in your mind?
C. (Closes eyes to imagine) – Yes!
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Thought-Experiment (Dialogue-Cued) Imagery
Imagination is thought to play a crucial role in thought-experiments, particularly those
used to probe children’s intuitive concepts of gravity. This was cued by questions
about the motion of falling objects such as thrown and dropped balls, water or juice
staying put or flowing from a bottle on this side and the other side of the Earth, and
a ball falling through a hole through the Earth as follows:
Imagine that you throw a ball up into the air; what happens to the ball?
Imagine that you have a drink of orange juice from a bottle. You don't drink all of it,
there is some left. Imagine that you put the bottle down on the ground carefully with the
top off: what happens to the juice?
Imagine that your friend on the other side of the Earth puts their drink bottle down on
the ground—what happens to their juice?
Imagine that there is a well hole in your garden that is very, very deep. Imagine that you
dropped a ball into the well hole: what happens to the ball?
They could also imagine seasonal change such as falling leaves in autumn and falling
snow in winter. However, sometimes imagery cases were difficult to classify because
they were intertwined, as when children could imagine seasonal change but not ESM
motion. It was evident that in some cases general imagery was associated with more
common phenomena such as seasonal effects rather than the less tangible phenomena
of specific imagery such as the rotation and revolution of the Earth. It is also possible
that a child’s drawing of the seasons leaves an image in memory which is more
accessible than images associated with drawing of the motion of the ESM which was
done earlier in the interview, the imagery questions being usually asked immediately
following questions on the seasons.
Protocols
Natasha (NZ European: female; age 10 years 8 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon did you think of any
stories that you’ve been told about them or stories you’ve read about them?
C. (Shakes head).
R. Did you see any pictures in your imagination – like when I was telling you about
Alice falling down that hole – could you imagine that?
R. Or the ball falling down the hole?
C. (Nods).
R. You could imagine that?
C. (Nods).
R. And when I was asking you about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon moving,
could you see them moving in your imagination – or not?
C. (Nods).
R. [I clarify that a shake of the head means “No” and a nod means “Yes”].
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Jiang Ting Yu (China: Han: female; age 5 years 10 months)
R. When we talk about the Earth, and the Sun and the Moon and things like the ball
falling down the hole, can you imagine things moving?C. Yes.
Li Jin Zhu (China: Han: female; age 5 years 9 months)
R. When we talk about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon and things moving –
(and) we talk about the seasons and the swallows flying and things like that – and the
leaves falling from the trees and the snow falling – can you imagine things moving in
your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. Can you imagine the swallows?
C. Yes.
R. Can you imagine the swallows moving?
C. Yes.
Wang Pu Yi (China: Han: male; age 7 years 7 months)
R. When we talk about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon and the seasons, can you
imagine things moving?
C. Yes.
R. When you were drawing the snow or the leaves can you imagine them falling?
C. Yes.
Zhu Xing Yu (China: Han: male; age 8 years 0 months)
[Child drew falling leaves and flying beetles as characteristic of autumn].
R. When you imagine (draw and talk about) things like leaves falling and beetles
flying can you actually see them flying or falling in your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. And when we talk about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon moving, can you
imagine them moving?
C. Yes.
Story-Related Imagery Involving Recollections from Books, Videos and the Internet
In response to the questions:
When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon, did you think of any stories you have
been told about them? Did you see any words (in your imagination)?
Young people recalled or re-created dynamic imagery of the ESM from illustrations in books
such as children in New Zealand imagining the Māori hero Maui capturing and slowing the
Sun with ropes in Maui and the Sun (Bishop 1996). Some could recall words in the form of
rhymes from the book Alice in Wonderland (Carroll 1865/2003; on which the hole-through-
the-Earth thought-experiment is based), but they could not visualise the words as such. Others
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could visualise sections of the video of the story. In other words, children could recall specific
spoken words in a musical or rhythmical form (such as rhyme) but not general dialogue.
Children in China could recall stories of the creation of the Sun and Moon from 365 Nights
stories (Zhang 2011).
Protocols
Joshua (NZ European: male; age 9 years 6 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon, did you think of any stories you
have been told about them?
C. Yes.
R. Have you ever been told any stories about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon?
C. I’ve been told three.
R. What were the stories?
C. I can’t remember the names – two of them were Māori ones – one of them was – there
were a couple of people (Maui) who were trying to stop the Sun from moving so fast.
Zoya (NZ European: female; age 8 years 7 months)
[Extract from “Hole through the Earth” thought experiment.]
R. Imagine what would happen to a ball dropped into a hole through the Earth. I got
this idea from the story Alice in Wonderland. Do you know the story?
C. Yes.
R. What happened then?
C. She fell down into the little room ... and the rabbit went into the door (entrance to the
rabbit hole) and said “I’m late, I’m late, for a very important date.”
Child chants verse to tune. Sequence of events is jumbled but essence of story is intact.
Zoe (NZ European: female; age 8 years 4 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon, did you think of any stories you
have been told about them?
C. Yes.
R. Did you see any words or pictures (in your imagination)?
C. Yes.
R. Did you see anything moving in your imagination?
C. Yes.
R. Where did you get your ideas from?
C. From the book (Alice in Wonderland).
R. When I asked you about the hole going through the Earth what were you thinking
about?
C. I was thinking about a video of it.
R. Have you seen a movie of Alice – a video?
C. Yes.
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Daniel (NZ European: male; age 9 years 7 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon did you think of any stories you
have been told about them?
C. No – not really – but I’ve read lots of books about the Earth and that moving around.
R. Did you see any words or any pictures or anything like that when you were
thinking about the Earth and the Sun and the Moon?
C. Yes I do – I think about it moving around and see it.
R. So you see it as a kind of picture?
C. Yes.R When you think about it – when you see pictures of things – or visions of things –
can you see them moving?
C. Yes.
R. In your mind?
C. Yes – in my mind – when I think – talk about things moving – I think about them
moving.
Tekaranga (NZ Māori: male; age 9 years 7 months)
Recalled “The cow jumped over the Moon” and the Māori legend “Maui and the Sun” –
(see Fig. 3).
Yang Feng Xu (China: Han: male; age 9 years 4 months)
R. When I asked you about the Earth, Sun and Moon did you think of any stories you
have been told about them?
C. Yes (child relates story of Sun from “365 nights”)
R. Did you see any pictures in your imagination?
C. Yes (continues story of Sun from “365 nights”)
R. Do you see things moving when you think of these stories – do you see them
moving in your imagination?
C. Yes.
Fig. 4 Percentage of children reporting/not reporting pictures of shape of ESM in their imagination
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When I ask you questions about the play-dough and so on, can you imagine things
moving?
C. Yes.
Additional Forms of Imagery
In addition to these four predicted types of imagery, three additional forms were
found: those inspired by (a) visits to museums, (b) dreams and (c) unconscious
imagery becoming conscious through Socratic dialogue focusing on what the child
had said, drawn or modelled. Sometimes concepts such as the motion of ESM could
be recalled and the source of information identified, but the child had no knowledge
of words or pictures or imagery.
Imagination Without Pictures or Imagery
As described above, at the end of their multi-modal interviews, children were asked whether
they could see pictures or images when they were thinking about the shape and motion of
ESM, habitation of and identity with Earth; intuitive concepts of gravity; and seasons and
eclipses. Examples of the interview protocols, imagery protocols, Socratic dialogue and
drawings are given in Figs. 2 and 3. Regarding Fig. 3, the Imagery protocol shows Socratic
dialogue where the researcher probes what the child knows about the legend of the Maori hero
Maui slowing the Sun. In the legend at the foot of Fig. 3, ‘everyday’ imagery (in contrast to
‘scientific’ imagery) refers to the now conventionally understood meaning as ‘naïve’, ‘intui-
tive’ or ‘non-scientific’.
The percentages of children reporting that they see pictures of shape, and dynamic-imagery
of the motion, of the ESM in their imagination at three school stages (kindergarten and pre-
school, junior primary and senior primary) are displayed in Figs. 4 and 5. They show an
increase in reported pictures and imagery with age. However, almost all of these children
demonstrated that they could imagine (picture) static concepts such as:
Fig. 5 Percentage of children reporting/not reporting pictures of motion of ESM in their imagination
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Examples of similarity of Earth shape, Structure, Habitation and Identity drawings illustrating more recent and older memory: New Zealand & China
Name (Age) & Description Earth Shape, Structure, Habitation and Identity Drawings2
Casey (6)
Similar houses on Ground in 
1st & 2nd  Day/Night & 2nd 
Shape drawings. Reversal of 
chimneys and smoke in 1st 
and 2nd Day/Night drawings.
1st Day/Night Drawing 2nd Day/Night Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Jamiee (11)
Similar images of Earth in 1st 
and 2nd Motion and Shape 
drawings. Similar Self & Friend 
(stick gures) in 1st and 2nd 
Shape drawings.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Motion Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Liao Jin (9)
Similar images of the Earth 
in 1st Shape drawings (two 
drawn on same day); and 
2nd Shape drawings (two 
also drawn on same day a 
year later). Dual-hemisphere 
concept of the Earth with the 
Sun and Moon added in 2nd 
drawing.
1st Shape Drawing(1) 1st Shape Drawing (2) 2nd Shape Drawing (1) 2nd Shape Drawing (2)
Chen Yue (10)
Similar images of Earth in 1st 
and 2nd Motion and Shape 
drawings. Similar Self & Friend 
(stick gures) in 1st and 2nd 
Shape drawings.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Note. 1Age in years at rst interview. 2The (1st) Motion, Day/Night and Shape drawings were drawn in that order during the interviews a few hours to a few days apart. The (2nd) follow up (longitudinal) 
interviews were conducted one year after the rst. The drawings done in sequence during a single interview are considered to be indicative of more recent memory; while those done a year later are thought to 
be representative of older memory.
Fig. 6 Examples of similarity of Earth shape, structure, habitation and identity drawings illustrating more recent
and older memory: New Zealand and China
Examples of similarity of Sun shape drawings illustrating more recent and older memory: New Zealand & China
Name (Age) & Description Sun Shape and Structure Drawings
James (9)
Prominence at 8 o’clock in 1st 
Shape drawing; repeated in 
same position in 2nd Shape 
drawing. Larger prominence 
at 1 o’clock in 2nd Shape 
drawing. Contrast with 
symbolic images of Sun in 2nd 
Motion and 2nd Day/Night 
drawings.
1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing 2nd Motion Drawing 2nd Day/Night Drawing
Holly (11)
Repetition of flame like 
structure in 1st & 2nd Motion 
and Shape drawings.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Motion Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Li Xin (8)
Similar images in 1st Motion, 
Day/Night and Shape 
drawings; and 2nd Shape 
drawing (alternate long and 
short rays).
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Chen Yue (10)
Almost identical images in 
1st Motion, 1st Day/Night, 
and 2nd Shape drawings: 1st 
Shape drawing similar but not 
identical: alternate long and 
short rays in former; regular 
curved rays in latter.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Fig. 7 Examples of similarity of Sun shape drawings illustrating more recent and older memory: New Zealand
and China
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Examples of similarity of Moon shape drawings illustrating more recent and older memory: New Zealand & China
Name (Age) & Description Moon Shape and Structure Drawings
Aroha (7)
Similar crescent and full 
Moons in 1st Motion, Day/
Night, and Shape drawings; 
image of crescent Moon 
reversed in 2nd Shape 
drawing (by top to bottom 
rotation  perpendicular to 
page rather than clockwise or 
anti-clockwise rotation).
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Brayden (8)
Similar images of crescent 
Moon in 1st Motion, Day/
Night, and Shape drawings; 
with 45 degree clockwise 
rotation between the former.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing
Li Xin (8)
Similar images of crescent 
Moon in 1st Motion, Day/
Night, and Shape drawings. 
Change in order of phases in 
2nd Shape drawing with fuller 
crescent on left rather than 
right; but orientation towards 
NW maintained.
1st Motion Drawing 1st Day/Night Drawing 1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Wang Sheng Jun (10)
Image reversal from phases 
facing left in 1st Shape 
drawing; to phases facing 
right in 2nd Shape drawing.
1st Shape Drawing 2nd Shape Drawing
Fig. 8 Examples of similarity of Moon shape drawings illustrating more recent and older memory: New Zealand
and China
Fig. 9 Frequency of similar images in the same interview (more recent memory)
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& The shape of ESM
& Themselves living on this side of the Earth (habitation and identity study)
& Friends living a long way away on the other side of the Earth (habitation study)
& Well holes (preliminary to hole-through-the-Earth thought-experiment)
(see Bryce and Blown 2013)
They could also imagine dynamic concepts such as:
& The motion of ESM
& Throwing and dropping balls; water/juice falling from a bottle on this side and the other
side of the Earth
& A ball falling through a hole through the Earth (as part of gravity studies)
(see Blown and Bryce 2013, data in Table 1)
It is worth noting that there were no significant differences between the cultures apart from
greater knowledge of well holes on the part of children in China (where wells are more
common than in NZ). Both static and dynamic imagery can be seen to increase with age as a
result of development and experience with the world including learning from teachers, parents,
books, TV and other knowledge sources. The positive responses showed a coexistence of
everyday and scientific ideas, and imagination was generally found to be active throughout the
interviews, sometimes tending to take the subject matter off on a tangent as children shared
their experiences and offered their hypotheses of phenomena. Looking at the results another
way: If such high percentages of NZ and China children report a lack of pictures of ESM shape
and a lack of imagery of ESM motion, how can they actually create and re-create concepts of
ESM shape and motion in three different modalities? Considering the implications for or
Fig. 10 Frequency of similar images in longitudinal repeated interview (older memory)
Research in Science Education
against a representational form of memory, these results do appear to suggest that children
have two forms of imagination: one conscious in the form of ‘pictures in the mind’ or imagery
that can be created by mental processes prompted by questions as in an interview setting and
shared with others through dialogue, drawing and modelling. The second unconscious imag-
inings involving non-representational processes with no conscious pictures or imagery, but
nevertheless able to create and re-create static and dynamic concepts such as the shape and
motion of ESM—the conscious form of imagination becoming more common with age; the
unconscious form being general.
Similarity of Representations of Imagery over Time
It was found that there were similarities between ESM shape and motion drawings over time.
Although the process is unknown, it seems that the mind is capable of re-creating identical or
almost identical images over time and these can be represented as drawings. The minor
differences between drawings suggest either slight differences in the process of image creation
or slight errors in the process of translation of the images into drawings through representation
(see Figs. 6, 7 and 8, where the thumb-nail figures should be compared horizontally by row,
not vertically by column). Some of the children who reported that they could not see pictures
or images in their imagination were nevertheless able to re-create similar representations over
time. This strongly suggests that the processes of imagery in memory are non-representational.
(As Edelman reasoned, memory’s non-representational character results in later recollections
varying in detail; the construction and re-construction from conceptual elements does not
manifest in exact replication.) These results are shown graphically in Figs. 9 and 10.8
Inspection shows that the frequency of similar images in the same interview (more recent
memory) is in most cases greater than the frequency of similar images in longitudinal repeated
interviews (older memory), findings that are in keeping with memory being inexact and non-
representational.
Evidence in Support of the Hypothesis Posed by Research Question
On the basis of what we detect in these interview analyses, the high coherence between
imagery formed when talking, drawing and modelling supports the hypothesis that memory is
dynamic, multi-modal and non-representational. The processes of memory create imagery
which appear to the conscious mind as static and moving pictures. These afford reproduction
into descriptions, drawings and models by processes of interpretation, but the memories,
thoughts and images themselves are too dynamic to be representational in any meaningful
sense. Rather than being a computer with stored information which can be recalled, the brain is
a dynamic organ capable of creating concepts unconsciously from a myriad of elements (some
everyday, some scientific) and able to share these with the conscious mind through imagery
and other thought processes (such as inner speech), enabling the individual to visualise and
reflect. These in turn may be shared with others through external speech, writing, drawing and
8 In Figs. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, by ‘more recent memory’, we mean memory and imagery recalled or re-created
during the same interview, i.e. within a period of several minutes to a few hours to a few days (the interviews
being weather dependent and having to fit in with normal school activities), whereas by ‘older memory’, we
mean memory and imagery recalled or re-created during the second of the longitudinal interviews a year later.
The latter is influenced by learning and experience and, in many cases, inadvertently enhanced by the influence
of repeated interviews and Socratic dialogue (see Bryce and Blown 2006; Blown and Bryce 2006).
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modelling by acts of representation. If memory was representational, one would expect all
children to have recollections of pictures and similar images, but that is not the case. Several
children had no knowledge of ‘seeing’ pictures in their imagination but were nevertheless able
to explain, draw and model their concepts. This does suggest that there is some unconscious
process by which conceptual interpretations cued by the researcher’s questions are compared
in the child’s mind with memories of these concepts from a rich variety of sources. This could
well involve unconscious imagery, or imagery unconscious to some children but not to others.
But it does not have to involve representation in the form of a search for depictions as in
scanning the pictures in an illustrated book or album. It may also be the case that we become
more conscious of our imagination with development.
We did not set out to identify the format of children’s mental representations as such in
addressing our research question, mainly because we wished to keep an open mind about the
possibility that imagery and memory are non-representational. We found no evidence of
Pylyshyn’s propositional representation since our methodology could not gauge the use of
mental symbols in a propositional sense with sufficient refinement. There was, however, some
evidence of non-representational memory as advocated by Edelman. Further research to
ascertain which if any of the competing theories are correct awaits input from neuroscience.
It is a question of considering alternative interpretations of evidence. We have put our
argument in favour of memory and associated imagery being non-representational. While this
is by no means conclusive, it does invite further enquiry into the nature of consciousness and
whether or not representation is essential to thought including concept creation and re-creation.
The data provided here is but a small fraction of the available evidence. As reported, there were
141 participants but space limited the selection to only a tenth of that number to be included as
representative of the sample and included as protocols and drawings (see Figs. 2 and 3).
However, as can be inferred from Table 1, a rich range of examples of both static and dynamic
imagery was obtained across the age groups. Likewise, the drawings of similarity in ESM
drawings over time (see Figs. 6, 7 and 8) are a small sample of the available data selected to
illustrate the arguments in this paper.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results have shown how subjects recollected images of the shape and motion of the ESM
during repeated interviews at intervals of minutes to several months apart. Although similar (in
some cases almost identical), these representations have slight (often subtle) variations in
drawings made within and between interviews9 on a given date. The evidence presented in
9 For example, (1), in the case of the Earth, young children drawing the Earth as spherical, complete with ‘Self’
and ‘Friend on the other side of the Earth’ but with differences in the orientation of houses and the location of
‘Self’ and ‘Friend’. Or, similar aged children drawing a dual-hemisphere Earth with ‘Self’ and ‘Friend’ standing
on the surface of a truncated sphere; again with variations in the proportions of ‘Ground’, biosphere (the area
where people live) and ‘Sky’ (see Fig. 6). Or, (2), in the case of the Sun, with young subjects drawing the Sun
with prominences (‘explosions’); and repeating the same structure a year later with one in the same place and
another in a new location. We have also shown how children might draw the Sun with a flame-like structure
around its periphery representing the corona; and repeat the same structure a year later; or with 18 alternately long
and short rays drawn a year apart but with some at different angles to the Sun (see Fig. 7). Or (3), in the case of
the Moon, children maintaining the shape but changing the orientation of its phases within and between
longitudinal interviews, sometimes involving not only clockwise and anti-clockwise rotation in the plane of
the page, but also top to bottom rotation perpendicular to the page (see Fig. 8).
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Figs. 2 and 3 support the first strand of the argument we set out in relation to the research
question: that imagination has both conscious (representational) and non-conscious (non-
representational) forms as summarised in Figs. 4 and 5. Further evidence presented pictorially
in Figs. 6, 7 and 8 and their related protocols support the second strand of the argument: that
the basic patterns of concepts can be re-created hours, days, weeks or years between longitu-
dinal interviews. These replications are approximations or analogues characterised by similar-
ity rather than identical reproduction, as one would anticipate if memory was akin to a
computer or imagery akin to a still or movie camera. The contrast between the frequency
with which many children did not report images during any interview, yet proceeded to
conceptualise effectively (explain/draw/model) (strand 3), also suggests that memory may be
a non-representational process.
It is arguable that both facilities (unconscious imagery; and achieving similarity of
representation over time) are related to pattern recognition—an evolutionary survival
adaptation enabling early humans to detect predators and other dangerous creatures
such as snakes and spiders. In modern times, this kind of skill enables astronomers to
detect new features in the heavens such as comets and supernovae by comparing two
images (mental or physical) over time. A comparable skill enables radiographers to
detect changes in MRI images and X-rays to monitor injuries and disease by com-
paring images over time. Similar skills based on non-representative dynamic memory
enable children to create detailed patterns of ESM shape and re-create them over
time—changes in pattern resulting from learning and observation, as in the aforemen-
tioned examples.
Regarding the methodology used here, we consider that carefully conducted clinical
interviews yield valid data which can give insights into how children think, including the
processes of imagery, memory and metacognition. Neuroscience is also providing evidence in
support of theories such as concept coexistence, but at this stage, the results are tentative.
Neuroscientists see areas of the brain which are active during questioning, but cannot know
what the neuronal interactivity is carrying, ‘message-wise’. Some findings from neuroscience
can be regarded as provisional: e.g. proof of coexistence and inhibition is inferred from delays
in responses to questions, but as yet, there is no hard verification of these processes. Currently,
clinical interviews, if conducted in a sensitive way by experienced researchers, remain the best
method of investigating imagery, memory and metacognition (as researchers like Vosniadou
and diSessa have productively demonstrated). The new theoretical account we have set out in
this paper explains evidence that, rather than being compared with some form of mental model
or template as a complete working entity, concepts appear to be dynamically constructed from
selected elements created in memory: for example, images of the Earth having elements of
physical shape including flatness or sphericity (see Fig. 1); images of the Sun having elements
of shape and rays, and, with more senior pupils, possibly sunspots and flares; and across a
wide age range, images of the Moon being dominated by elements related to the conflict
between cultural and scientific interpretations of phases, maria and craters. An explanation has
been offered which explains why children are able to describe, draw and model ESM in very
similar ways months apart and how children are able to describe, draw and model ESM
without conscious imagery.
Reflecting on the history of mental models in science education research, it is evident
that many researchers have imagined mental models as existing in the minds of children;
there to be revealed—by interview questions, by Socratic dialogue or by (future)
neuroscience? However, perhaps their existential status has been exaggerated. Are they
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only devices which serve to categorise children’s concepts—researchers’ constructions
imposed (however carefully) upon a wide range of the elements of a child’s knowledge
in a particular domain? It may be that some researchers contemplate both possibilities.
Also, it is to be hoped that developments in brain research will soon clarify the
relationships between the conscious and unconscious processes which underlie people’s
responses to questioning. It would not be appropriate to pursue this line of argument
further at this stage. Fresh investigations are needed to seek wider support for the ideas
contained here. As a first step, we consider that the considerations raised in this paper
should be explored in relation to other scientific topics and concepts which figure in
children’s learning.
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